This paper presents the economic rationale for a regional trade bloc in
I. Introduction
The concept of an Asian economic community was first proposed at the Bali ASEAN summit in 2003. The concept has been taken forward in the East Asia Summit held in December 2005. At this summit, ASEAN+3, India, and Australia and New Zealand came together to deliberate on the evolution of an Asian Economic Community on the lines of the European Union (EU). These developments notwithstanding, several initiatives are already under way towards achieving the objective of regional economic integration in Asia. Among these are agreements between the ASEAN regional grouping and Japan (AJCEP), China (ACCEC), Korea 1 (AKCCP), and India (AICEC). The framework agreement has been signed for all these initiatives. A further initiative at forming a preferential trading arrangement in the region comprising ASEAN+3 is under discussion and is seen by many as the building block of a future East Asian Community (EAC). The EAC can then become the harbinger of the Asian Economic Community.
Regional economic integration or preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) among economies in any region have, however, raised several concerns. A primary concern is whether the PTA implies an efficiency cost and, as a consequence, undermines trade liberalization through the multilateral process. Given that a PTA accords preferential treatment to members vis-à-vis non-members, there is always a possibility of trade being diverted away from non-members to members. On occasion when non-members are more efficient producers, this process of trade diversion will imply a cost in terms of denying both the producers and the consumers access to lower cost and more efficiently produced goods. A preferential trading arrangement, therefore, needs to be evaluated to determine if there are efficiency costs by way of distortion in the patterns of trade away from those expected on the basis of comparative advantage.
Having regard to this background of regional economic integration in Asia and the concerns raised on efficiency costs, there is a need to undertake an analysis of the proposed new regional arrangement in Asia. While several studies have examined the idea of regional economic integration in Asia, these studies have focused on separate regions of ASEAN such as North East Asia (the plus three economies of China, Japan and Korea) and the ASEAN+3. Xu (2003) provides evidence of increased interdependence among the ASEAN+3 economies in the area of trade, capital flows, and human resource mobility in support of economic integration in the region. ADB (2005) examines the extent of trade and investment integration in Asia by subregions like East Asia (defined as ASEAN 10; the People's Republic of China (PRC); Japan; Korea; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei, China) and South Asia using intra-regional trade and investment shares and intensity measures. A systematic assessment of these alternative regional arrangements in terms of efficiency or optimal sequencing of regional economic integration in Asia is however missing. Understanding the efficiency implications of the preferential trading arrangement is important as it will help policy-makers in participating countries to better prepare for and cope with economic integration in the region and evaluate the worth of the formation of future PTAs vis-à-vis multilateral liberalization. It is in this context, therefore, that we set out the research agenda for this paper. As such, this paper makes an attempt to identify the most efficient approach to the formation of a regional economic/trade arrangement in Asia that is inclusive of India.
2 This is the first ever efficiency-based analysis of sequencing regional economic integration in Asia.
To evaluate the most efficient approach to regional economic integration in Asia, we define Asia as inclusive of ASEAN, the plus three economies of China, Japan, and Korea, and India, i.e. the ASEAN+4. 3 Given that ASEAN is an existing regional bloc in Asia, alternative approaches to the alignment of the plus four economies with ASEAN for the formation of the ASEAN+4 trade bloc have been examined in terms of their efficiency costs. As a first step to our analysis, however, we establish the economic credentials of ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for regional economic integration in Asia.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, a detailed analysis of the trends in intra-regional trade of the ASEAN+4 economies is undertaken to determine if there is a significant trade bias evident among the member countries. The index of trade intensity and the more sophisticated measures like trade bias and complementarity indices have been used to establish the case for ASEAN+4 as a regional trade bloc. The westward extension of ASEAN+3 to include India as an integral member of the ASEAN+4 is explained in section III. Section IV presents a comparative perspective of the trends in trade for India and the plus three economies with ASEAN. Alternative routes to Asian economic integration in terms of their economic efficiency are examined in section V. Efficiency is interpreted in terms of least cost of adjustment of a country's production structure for participation in the preferential trading arrangement by itself as also against multilateral liberalization. The regional orientation index has been used jointly with the index of comparative advantage to analyse existing and potential inefficiencies in trade patterns. Costs that may have to be incurred by any of the plus four countries on account of trade diversion following a pre-emptive entry in ASEAN by any one country are estimated in section VI. Section VII concludes with a presentation of the main findings of our analysis and their implications for shaping economic regionalism in Asia. As the drive towards regionalism in Asia gained momentum only after the 1997-98 East Asian crisis, the reference period for the analysis in this paper is [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . For the purpose of comparison, where required, the analysis has also been undertaken for the period 1995-99. UNCOMTRADE-based trade 4 (export and import) data classified according to the Harmonized System (HS) at the 2-and 6-digit levels have been used for analysis.
II. The Case for ASEAN+4 as a Potential Trade Bloc

II.1 The Potential Strength of ASEAN+4
The ASEAN+4 region comprising two of the most dynamic economies in the world that is India and China is referred to as the "Arc of Advantage". As may be noticed from the available facts presented in Table 1 , the gross national income of the countries comprising this regional bloc is over US$7.6 trillion in 2003 and is comparable to the US$9.4 trillion gross national income of the EU. In terms of purchasing power parity, the national income of ASEAN+4 is US$16 trillion and is more than the national income of NAFTA which is US$13 trillion or of the EU which is US$11 trillion. The combined total reserves of this region are about US$2 trillion and are much larger than that of the EU. Given that the proposed fourteencountry singular economic entity of ASEAN+4 has a 19 per cent share in total world trade, which is almost as much as that of NAFTA, and contributes 21 per cent of the global output and is in addition home to about half of the world's population, it has the potential to impact the global as well as the regional economies.
II.2 Trends in Intra-regional Trade
The case for ASEAN+4 as a potential trade bloc in Asia is proposed on the basis of the encouraging trends evident in intra-bloc trade. Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade at an aggregate level for the ASEAN+4 economies along with some selected blocs is shown in Table 2 . Trade among the member nations of ASEAN+4 as against their trade with the rest of the world registered an increase in the period 1995-2003 even though there was a fall in 1999, possibly on account of the East Asian crisis. In 2003 intrabloc trade for ASEAN+4 was 44 per cent. This value of intra-regional trade share is higher than the corresponding share for many of the existing trade blocs in the year of their formation. For example, intra-bloc trade for NAFTA was 42.1 per cent in 1994 and for Mercusor it was 12.9 per cent in 1991. 5 It is also evident from Table 2 that the potential of ASEAN+4 as a candidate for regional economic integration is higher than that of the existing regional bloc in Asia, that is ASEAN. Intra-ASEAN trade is less than that for ASEAN+4. This fact is further corroborated when the trends for intra-bloc exports and imports shown in Tables 3   TABLE 1 6 This conclusion is further substantiated when the degree of "trade bias" among member nations of the proposed bloc is evaluated using the index of trade intensity (TI). As noted by Petri (1992) , increases in intra-regional trade signify an increase in interdependence but do not give a strong indication of the "bias" towards regionalization, as they may reflect changes in other variables, especially income growth. The growth in internal trade shares may, therefore, reflect incomeinduced changes in imports, rather than a rise in "natural" tendency to trade. To control this effect the TI index normalizes the bilateral or intraregional trade shares according to the importance of the country or region in total world trade. The index of trade intensity with a value greater than one is indicative of higher bilateral trade than can be expected on the basis of the countries' share in world trade. The change in the value of the index over time reveals if any two countries/groupings are experiencing an increased or decreased tendency to trade with one another. An increasing value of the index is indicative of enhanced prospects for further integration while a decreasing value would suggest diminished prospects. The TI index, therefore, provides additional insights into the prospects for regional economic integration. Table 5 summarizes the change in the TI index 7 at three time points 8 in our reference period. For a comparative picture the TI indices at the same time points are also shown for some select trade blocs. The TI index as shown in Table 5 exceeds unity for all the three time points in our reference period. This is indicative of "intense" trade relations within the ASEAN+4 regional grouping. 9 The TI index for ASEAN+4 is comparable to that for NAFTA, 10 particularly around the time of the latter's coming into effect. 11 Trends in the index of trade intensity further confirm the claim of ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for a regional trade bloc in Asia. India's alignment with ASEAN+4 is, however, justifiable on account of the rate at which its trade with India is growing relative to that with the plus three economies, increased share vis-à-vis other major trading blocs and partner countries in India's total trade and the growing importance of India as a market for exports of ASEAN+4 economies. We present evidence in support of India's increasing trade linkages with the proposed bloc.
III. The Case for India in ASEAN+4
III.1 Rate of Growth of Total Trade with ASEAN+4
The rate of growth of total trade of the plus four economies with ASEAN+4 is presented in Table 7 . It is observed that the rate of growth of India's total trade with ASEAN+4 over 1999-2003 is close to that of China and greater than that of Japan and Korea. Among the plus four economies, India, registered the highest annual rate of growth of total trade with ASEAN+4 over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] .
III.2 Trade with ASEAN+4 vis-à-vis Other Regional Blocs
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India's trade with regional blocs presents an interesting picture (Table 8 ). In 1995, the EU (15/25) was the most significant trading bloc for While available trends on intra-ASEAN+4 trade establish the strength of the group by itself and relative to the existing bloc in Asia, that is, ASEAN for regional economic integration, there is a need to ascertain the relative positioning of India vis-à-vis the other three economies. The need to contextualize India in the proposed bloc becomes evident when we look at the share of each of the plus four economies in intra-ASEAN+4 trade (Table 6 ). It is observed that India makes the lowest contribution to intraregional trade (exports and imports) for the proposed trade bloc. In comparison with Japan that has the maximum share of 28 and 25 per cent in total regional exports and imports respectively in 2003, India's share at about 2 and 3 per cent in exports and imports respectively is the lowest.
India in terms of its share in total trade. Trade with the EU constituted 28 per cent of India's total trade. This was followed by NAFTA at around 15 per cent and ASEAN at 8 per cent. In 2003, the share of EU in India's total trade has fallen to 21 per cent and the share of the proposed ASEAN+4 bloc has increased to about 20 per cent. 13 With its share in India's total trade having increased to equal that of the EU, ASEAN+4 has emerged as the other dominant partner bloc for India.
III.3 Trade with ASEAN+4 vis-à-vis Rest of the World
India's trade orientation towards the proposed trade bloc is also apparent when we look at the increasing divergence between the shares of ASEAN+4 and the rest of the world in India's total trade. As is evident from Figure 1 , there is a clear increase in the share of ASEAN+4 in India's total trade at the expense of the rest of the world. Over the period 2000-2003 the share of ASEAN+4 in India's total trade has increased from 15 to almost 20 per cent and that of rest of the world registered a fall from 85 to 80 per cent.
Concerning individual member nations, three of the ASEAN+4 countries -China, Japan and Singapore -feature among the top ten trading partners for India in 2003. Singapore and China first emerged among the top ten trading partners for India in 2000 and have remained so since then. China has over the same period emerged as the third-largest trading partner for India (Table 9) .
III.4 India as a Market for ASEAN+4
Simultaneous with the increase in the share of ASEAN+4 in India's total trade, it is observed that there is an increase in India's relevance for the ASEAN+4 nations. Evidence shows that India is increasingly being looked at as a market for exports (Table 10) . Over the years 1995-2003 India registered the highest rate of growth in the region for Chinese and Indonesian exports. India is second only to China as the most attractive market in the region for Korean, Malaysian and Thai exports.
The fact that India is emerging as an important market for intra-regional exports is corroborated when we look at India's trade with ASEAN+4. It may be seen from Table 11 that the average annual rate of growth of imports of India from ASEAN+4 exceeds the rate of growth of India's exports to ASEAN+4. In addition, when compared with other plus four economies, the rate of growth of India's imports from ASEAN+4 is second to China and significantly higher than that of Japan and Korea.
To recap:
• Trends in intra-bloc trade reveal the strength of ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for regional economic integration.
• Trends in index of trade intensity further substantiate the claim of ASEAN+4 as a regional trade bloc in Asia. • In the proposed trade bloc, though India's share in total intra-bloc trade is the lowest relative to the plus three economies yet its alignment with the ASEAN+4 bloc is justified on account of its growing trade linkages with the proposed bloc.
Having noted the case for the justification for the inclusion of India in the proposed bloc of ASEAN+4, we analyse if India can be positioned in a manner similar to the plus three economies or if there are any features characterizing India that make it distinct from the other three economies and which may have implications for trade integration in Asia. For this purpose we undertake a comparative analysis of the trade bias towards the proposed bloc as exhibited by India and the plus three economies.
IV. India vis-à-vis the Plus Three Economies
It is observed that the share of trade with ASEAN+4 in total trade, exports and imports is far greater for the plus three economies than for India. In 2003, the share of ASEAN+4 in Korea's total trade is 41 per cent, double the region's share of 20 per cent in India's total trade. Corresponding shares for China and Japan are 33 and 36 per cent respectively. Similar trends are observed for exports and imports (Table 12 ).
The TI index 14 further highlights the difference between India and the plus three economies vis-à-vis ASEAN+4. The TI index for each of the plus four economies with ASEAN+4 is presented in Table 13 . The value of the TI index is close to 2 for all the plus three economies. This implies intense trade of these economies with ASEAN+4. In contrast the TI value of India with ASEAN+4 is yet to attain the value of unity. This suggests that unlike the plus three economies India does not at present reveal a marked trade bias towards the ASEAN+4.
Clearly then, even though India's trade relations with ASEAN+4 are growing and doing so at a rate higher than that for any of the other plus four economies, the magnitude of trade and also the intensity of trade are not yet comparable with that of any of the plus three economies. This trend is borne out by our calculations of the bilateral trade bias index (BI). The BI 15 measures the average influence of relatively low or high resistances to individual commodity trade between one group of countries and another as compared with the latter's trade with the rest of the world. A BI index with a value greater than unity indicates a positive influence or bias while a value less than unity measures a negative influence. The bias indices shown in Table 14 present the picture of India's differential position among the plus four economies even more vividly. Given that the value of the index is less than unity, India's trade bias is not yet as intense as or comparable with that of the plus three economies' towards the ASEAN+4.
So, India's trade with ASEAN+4 increasing at a rate greater than that of any of the plus three economies and its increasing importance as a market for ASEAN+4 provides the basis for accepting India as an integral part of ASEAN+4. 16 However, the share of the proposed bloc in the plus three economies' total trade is far greater than and more intense relative to its share in India's total trade. So a de facto market-led integration of the plus three economies with ASEAN (the ASEAN+3) 17 is evident. In the ASEAN+4 set of countries, India thus stands out as the "distant" economy. For a trade bloc comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, and India it is therefore imperative that the path of integration for the "distant" economy be identified. Considering that the index of trade intensity and bias is greater than unity for India-ASEAN trade over [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] 18 we suggest that India should enter the ASEAN+4 by first aligning with ASEAN in an ASEAN+1 arrangement. This may happen through either of the following two options: 19 (i) ASEAN+1s: India's alignment on a plus one basis combined with all the plus three economies also entering through a plus one arrangement. A convergence of all the ASEAN+1 agreements will lead to the emergence of ASEAN+4; or (ii) ASEAN+3+1: As stated above, the ASEAN +3 already exists as a de facto market-led arrangement. India enters last through the ASEAN+1 route to constitute ASEAN+4.
We evaluate these two routes in terms of their efficiency costs using a two-part methodology which is explained below.
V. Most Efficient Route to ASEAN+4: ASEAN+3+1 or the ASEAN+1s?
V.1 Regional Orientation and Comparative Advantage
To estimate the efficiency costs associated with the alignment of the plus four economies with ASEAN we examine if the additional trade that is generated on account of the anticipatory effects of the proposed/under negotiation/signed preferential arrangements is primarily in products in which these countries reveal comparative advantage in the global market. The analysis will allow us to infer if additional trade and increased export dynamism is in products where the plus four countries have low enough costs to be competitive in the world market. If this does not hold true then the comparison suggests that the additional trade within the respective markets/trading arrangements is inefficient, has attached costs and could have been replaced by more efficient outside suppliers.
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The investigation is undertaken using two indices -the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 21 and the regional orientation (RO) index. The RO index conveys useful information about change in geographic patterns of trade as it takes the ratio of the share of a product in exports to the region to the share of the product in exports to third countries. The results of our analysis are presented in Table 15 . The efficiency costs are lower for alignment with ASEAN relative to ASEAN+4 for all the economies except Japan. For China the cost of alignment with ASEAN is low relative to alignment with ASEAN+4 and lowest among the plus four economies. In comparison with about 67 per cent for ASEAN+4 only 26 per cent sectors are such that despite being comparatively disadvantageously placed in the world market, China's exports from these sectors are getting increasingly oriented towards ASEAN. For India, in about 50 per cent of the sectors increased export orientation towards ASEAN is observed despite a lack of comparative advantage in the world market in comparison with 54 per cent such sectors in case of ASEAN+4. Corresponding figures for Korea are 68 and 78 per cent for ASEAN and ASEAN+4 respectively. Clearly, ASEAN+1 is a more cost efficient arrangement for all the economies except Japan.
25
V.2 Efficiency Costs vis-à-vis Multilateral Liberalization
Alignment of Comparative Advantage. In this section we estimate the efficiency costs by undertaking a comparison of the comparative advantage of each of the plus four economies in the ASEAN+4/ASEAN market and the world market. Alignment of the structure of a country's comparative advantage in the two markets (ASEAN and world or ASEAN+4 and world) will imply fewer shifts in the production structure and lower costs as a consequence of an FTA with either ASEAN+4 or ASEAN. In addition, we have also compared the RCA across the three markets cross classified by factor intensity. The analysis will provide evidence of a shift, if any, of the factors of production, between industries that may be required as a consequence of regional integration. The efficiency costs as estimated in this section will also be indicative of the cost of participation in the regional FTA relative to participation in multilateral liberalization which, according to conventional wisdom, is considered the "first best" solution for attaining the potential benefits of a more open world economy.
The index of RCA has been calculated at HS-6 digit level for the most recent year of our sample period that is 2003. 26 The alignment of RCAs has been checked using the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (SRCC) at the aggregate level (for all sectors) and separately for agriculture, manufacturing, minerals and fuels, chemicals and plastics and manufactures chiefly by materials and miscellaneous manufactures. 27 The SRCC, a non-parametric test, is often used to test for independence between two random variables. The range of possible values is from -1 to +1. A value close to +1/-1 will be interpreted to mean strong positive/negative rank correlation while a value of zero indicates a complete lack of correlation. For the purpose of our analysis, a high 28 rank correlation will be interpreted to mean the ranking of a country's industries by comparative advantage in a particular market, in this case, ASEAN or ASEAN+4 is similar to its ranking in the global market. A low coefficient will indicate that the ranking is considerably different across the two markets. The former implies lower cost of alignment with the respective preferential arrangement vis-à-vis the multilateral participation. The results are presented in Table 16 .
The value of the coefficient of SRC is fairly high at the aggregate level and for individual sectors for all economies. As against multilateral liberalization, participation in either of the two arrangements, that is, ASEAN+4 or ASEAN, does not imply significant shifts in the comparative advantage and, consequently, in the production structure. The extent of alignment is slightly higher at the aggregate level for all the economies for the ASEAN+4 market. (FI) are identified. These are primary, unskilled labour intensive, natural resource intensive, human capital intensive, and technology intensive. The export patterns of the economies reclassified according to these five categories are compared across markets -world and ASEAN and world and ASEAN+4 -for alignment using the SRCC. The results, presented in Table 17 , are interesting. The value of the coefficient varies across countries but again falls in the range of being classified as modest to high, with very few in the latter category. India stands out as distinctly different from the other plus three economies. The export structure is aligned broadly similarly in ASEAN and world and ASEAN+4 and world for India. The value of the SRCC is almost the same in the two target markets. This implies an indifference between alignment with ASEAN or ASEAN+4 for India as neither implies any major shift of factors from their current employment in industries as oriented towards production for the global market.
Alignment of Comparative Advantage and Shifts in Factor Intensity. Five categories of factor intensity
For the plus three economies ASEAN+4 is marginally more efficient than ASEAN. To consolidate our results efficiency costs in terms of a shift in factor intensity has been analysed using another approach. The number of commodities for which a country enjoys comparative advantage in each market has been counted in each FI category. A comparison is undertaken to see if there are major numerical differences across the global and regional markets. If true, it will imply shifts of the factors of production from one category to another and this displacement of factors may involve costs. The results are presented in Tables 18 and 19 . We observe a broad alignment of comparative advantage in terms of factor intensity for the plus four economies in the world and ASEAN/ ASEAN+4 markets. India has maximum comparative advantage revealed in unskilled labour-intensive commodities, followed by technology-intensive and human capital-intensive in that order -both in the world market and ASEAN/ASEAN+4 market. In general, India's revealed comparative advantage in ASEAN/ ASEAN+4 is in line with that in the global market. The numbers in ASEAN and ASEAN+4 are more or less similar and distinct differences or patterns are not evident. No major costs are anticipated on account of alignment with either of the preferential arrangements vis-à-vis the global market. The results are on similar lines for the plus three economies.
Based on the above analysis of efficiency conditions, it is considered that India's entry into the ASEAN+4 trade bloc will be more efficient if made through an ASEAN+1 arrangement. For China and Korea also, the ASEAN+1 framework will be the more appropriate route. While the ASEAN+4 is marginally more efficient vis-à-vis multilateral liberalization, costs of regional orientation of exports are lower for both Korea and China in an alignment with ASEAN in the ASEAN+1 arrangement. Alternative calculations of efficiency costs give a similar inference for Japan also. A convergence of the plus one initiatives of all the plus four economies with ASEAN may therefore be the more efficient route to achieving regional economic integration.
VI. If ASEAN+1: Is There a First Mover Advantage?
If Asian economic integration is to be achieved through a convergence of the ASEAN+1 initiatives, it is necessary that we analyse if a preemptive entry to ASEAN by any of the plus four economies will give it a first mover advantage vis-à-vis the other economies. Context and sequence of events is important in evaluating a preferential trading arrangement. The ASEAN-China FTA triggered a positive domino effect in the region. First, Japan followed suit by submitting a similar proposal and soon India and Korea also followed. The late entrants -Japan, India and Koreamay face export diversion on account of China being the first mover for FTA formation with ASEAN. This is particularly relevant as the Early Harvest Programme of the ASEAN-China framework agreement is already in implementation, and the FTA itself will be the first to be effective. In this section we examine if China's prior entry in ASEAN has an adverse impact through trade diversion on the other three economies. The degree to which each country is affected through trade diversion will depend critically on how much overlap there is between the exports of these countries. 29 Empirical analysis of the trade diversion effect of the ASEAN-China FTA on partners in the Asian FTA has not been undertaken so far. We undertake an analysis of the export similarity of the plus four economies using conventional techniques and, in addition, introduce innovations by evaluating the existing and potential overlap of comparative advantage of the plus four economies at the sector and commodity levels.
VI.1 Export Overlap
First, an evaluation of the degree of overlap of exports of the plus four economies has been undertaken by a simple analysis of export composition. The observations thus made are substantiated using the statistical technique of Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (SRCC). The SRCC is calculated for exports both at the 2-and 6-digit HS levels for India, China, Japan, and Korea to ASEAN in 2003. As a check of the robustness of the results, the above exercise using correlations is repeated using a separate and equally popular export similarity technique known as the Finger-Kreinin (F-K) Index. 30 The analysis of export composition reveals that there is very little similarity between the exports of India and the other three economies to ASEAN. Table  21 , however, allay the fears of trade diversion for all the four economies. The value of SRCC is low and, therefore, indicative of a negligible export overlap between the plus four economies reinforcing further our conclusion that the risk of trade diversion for a late entrant is low as is the first mover advantage. The F-K index is estimated at the 2-and 6-digit levels of disaggregation for India, China, Japan, and Korea. The results are given in Tables 22 and  23 . At the commodity level (HS-6 digit) the value of the index is small, thus corroborating the evidence on the SRCCs of the export structure of the plus four economies to ASEAN. The extent of competition between the plus three economies and India in the ASEAN market is almost non-existent. As the scope for trade diversion on account of export similarity of the plus four economies to ASEAN+4 is almost negligible, the ASEAN+1 arrangement can be perceived as an efficient vehicle to achieve regional economic integration in Asia.
VI.2 Overlap of Comparative Advantage
For greater robustness of our results we also examine the extent of overlap in comparative advantage that each economy enjoys in the ASEAN market at present or is likely to enjoy in the future. Two sets of commodities are identified.
(i) Overlap of existing comparative advantage:
The first set comprises commodities for which more than one of the plus four economies currently enjoys comparative advantage in the ASEAN market. (ii) Potential for overlap of comparative advantage: The second set comprises commodities for which the plus four economies can in future develop comparative advantage in ASEAN as they are currently advantageously placed in the world market. The potential possibility for exports of these commodities to ASEAN would be lost/ threatened on account of one of the plus four economies making a prior entry into the ASEAN market. The threat is more real if one of the plus four countries is at present the main country of origin of imports of these products for ASEAN.
Overlap of Existing Comparative Advantage.
Among the plus four economies, maximum overlap of existing comparative advantage in the ASEAN market is observed between India and China. For 52 per cent of the commodities where India and China have an advantage in the world market as well as in ASEAN, India enjoys greater comparative advantage relative to China in the ASEAN market. Indian exports of these commodities are likely to be adversely affected if China makes a prior entry in ASEAN. Trade will be diverted away from India. Further, for 72 per cent of these commodities, India is actually more competitive than China even in the world market. Among these are commodities like marine products (fish and mollusks) and leguminous vegetables that belong to sectors 1-8 (HS classification). 31 Tariff concessions have been offered on these commodities under the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) of China's FTA with ASEAN. India is, therefore, negatively affected through trade diversion on account of the implementation of the EHP of China's FTA with ASEAN. In the longer run when the ASEAN- China FTA is fully implemented the maximum number of products that are likely to suffer export diversion belongs to the cotton sector. Commodities like cotton sewing thread, plain weave cotton, cotton yarn, twill weave cotton, and woven fabric of cotton may suffer maximum export diversion. The advantage that China may get on account of an FTA may render it cheaper for ASEAN to import these commodities from China, in which case there is trade diversion from India and in addition efficiency loss for ASEAN. This implies that there is a cost to staying out of the ASEAN arrangement for India on account of China's pre-emptive entry in ASEAN. For Japan and Korea, on the other hand, the extent of trade diversion is greater vis-à-vis each other's entry in ASEAN rather than with respect to China's entry in ASEAN.
Potential for Overlap of Comparative Advantage.
As the threat of export diversion for India is evidently the highest from China, the potential for overlap comparative advantage is analysed for India vis-à-vis China only. The set is defined as commodities that ASEAN imports and where India currently enjoys comparative advantage in the world market and is either more or equally advantageously placed relative to China. It is interesting to note that even though at present China is not as advantageously placed in the world market as India, it is the main source of ASEAN imports. In these commodities India has a potential for developing comparative advantage in ASEAN as it is already far more advantageously placed than China in the world market. A set of nineteen such commodities is identified. Of these nineteen commodities, seven or 37 per cent belong to product groups like textiles, man-made filaments and footwears and gaiters that are intensive in unskilled labour (Table 24 ). The ASEAN-China FTA will further intensify exports of these commodities from China to ASEAN and simultaneously prevent India from exploiting its potential for exports to ASEAN. China's entry in ASEAN prior to India through the ASEAN-China FTA thus also implies potential trade diversion for India.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper alternative approaches to the alignment of the plus four economies with ASEAN for the formation of the ASEAN+4 trade bloc have been examined in terms of their efficiency costs. On the basis of an analysis of the trends in intra-regional trade, the study establishes the strength of ASEAN+4 as a potential trade bloc in Asia. Evidence on India's increasing trade linkages with ASEAN+4 is used to justify India's inclusion in the regional trade bloc. The share of the plus four economies reveals a de facto marketled integration for the ASEAN+3. India stands out as the "distant" economy in this set of countries. It is imperative therefore that any proposal for regional economic integration in Asia that is inclusive of India should focus on the optimal route for India's integration into the trade bloc.
Our results show that a prior alignment with ASEAN in the ASEAN+1 framework may be a more efficient or least cost path to entering the ASEAN+4 bloc for all the plus four economies. The costs of aligning with ASEAN in the plus one framework are lowest for China. Regionally oriented export patterns do not imply any significant costs of adjustment of the production structure or shift of factors of production away from those that are consistent with the orientation towards the global market. A convergence of the plus one initiatives may therefore be a more efficient route to achieving regional economic integration. This is also the more practical path to the emergence of an ASEAN plus four regional bloc as even though the ASEAN initiatives with China, Japan, Korea, and India may be seen as leading the region towards an economically integrated whole they are as yet within the framework of the ASEAN+1 agreements and ASEAN negotiates with each country separately.
Efforts will however need to be made within the region to ensure that the "ASEAN+1" agreement can act effectively as a stepping stone to an "ASEAN+4" agreement. Only if the ASEAN+1 agreements of the plus four economies are compatible with each other would there be hope of linking these agreements to constitute a regional economic entity in Asia in future. Compatibility is possible as the elements of the plus one agreements are still being negotiated. A greater focus on harmonization and consistency within ASEAN is required, say for example, with respect to the rules of origin that at present may be scattered and inconsistent with one another.
Finally, in case China makes a pre-emptive entry into ASEAN, which it is bound to considering that the EHP is already in effect and the FTA will be the first to be implemented, India, among the plus four economies, will be the most adversely affected due to trade diversion. The EHP of the ASEAN-China FTA that offers tariff concessions on commodities of sectors 1-8 (HS) will have a negative impact on India. Products like marine products -fish and molluscs -and leguminous vegetables are likely to suffer. In the longer run when the ASEAN-China FTA is fully implemented the maximum number of products that are likely to suffer export diversion in India belongs to the cotton sector. Commodities like cotton sewing thread, plain weave cotton, cotton yarn, twill weave cotton, and woven fabric of cotton may suffer maximum export diversion. In the long run the ASEAN-China FTA may also limit India's export potential in ASEAN in product groups like textiles, man-made filaments and footwears and gaiters that are largely unskilled labour intensive commodities. It is imperative therefore that India should hasten its process of negotiations for an early conclusion of the ASEAN-India FTA. For Japan and Korea trade diversion is expected to be greater vis-à-vis each other's entry in ASEAN rather than with respect to the early implementation of the ASEAN-China FTA. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Agriculture & allied commodities 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Agriculture & allied commodities (Baldwin 2006; Drysdale 2001) . At this stage the ASEAN+3 group is not a regional trading agreement. The focus in ASEAN+3 is on financial cooperation. 18. See Tables 13 and 14. 19. Note that for the plus three economies the TI and BI in Tables 13 and 14 indicate equal bias towards the existing and proposed bloc. 20. The issue is essentially whether RTAs foster "high cost" imports at the expense of "low cost" ones. The traditional calculations of trade diversion based on import data infer this from the displacement of imports from non-partners by those from partners, implicitly comparing partner and non-partner costs by their relative competitiveness in the pre-RTA regional market. In this section we follow the supplementary view as developed in Yeats (1997) where inference about "high" and "low" costs is made by implicitly comparing the relative competitiveness of partner and non-partner goods in world markets. Table A .4. 26 . As the arrangements are yet to fructify, we calculate efficiency costs using the most recent year 2003 as indicative of future costs. 27. The alignment of the structure of comparative advantage has been undertaken irrespective of the value of the index. Alternately alignment of only those commodities where countries are comparatively advantageously placed has also been tried. The results do not alter the earlier implications. 28. While no strict definitions are available we specify the range of 0-0.4 as low, 0.5-0.7 as modest and 0.8 and above as high for the SRCC. 29. Unlike the econometric analysis of trade diversion and trade creation effects of the PTAs using the gravity model and general equilibrium techniques, this exercise enables us to distinguish the trade diversion effects at the commodity level. Commodities/product groups where India is most threatened on account of trade diversion as a consequence of the ASEAN-China FTA are thus identified in this paper. 30. The F-K Index estimates the export similarity by calculating the relative importance of various commodities in the export structure of pairs of countries and then using a filtering technique, that is, S = ∑i min([X ia /∑X ia ], [X ib /∑X ib ]) Where i = trade by disaggregated commodity a, b = two countries The first ratio is the share of commodity i in country a's total exports and the second is the share of commodity i in country b's total exports. If these ratios are equal then the ratio in our formula would sum to one, indicating perfect similarity. On the other hand, if they are totally different, the formula would be zero. The index can thus range from 0 to 1. 31. A complete list of products where India is comparatively more advantageously placed in both the world and ASEAN market is provided in the Appendix, Table A .5. 
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